Note from the author: I visited Afghanistan a number of times during the period 2010 – 2011. During that time, I was a graduate student of Security Management and also starting my independent security consultancy, Strategic Edge. I first wrote the following article in June 2012 as part of my studies. I feel that it is still relevant today, not only in Afghanistan or for the U.S. military and developmental efforts there, but for any project, both public and private, in any of the world’s crisis regions. Hopefully this can somehow contribute to any international effort of providing human security to at-risk populations.
When a government agency conducts a significant number of programs and activities abroad, it faces the challenge of additional public pressure. It is often under scrutiny to account for taxpayer dollars, and it must constantly prove cost-efficiency and the worthiness of its programs.
In the case of the Unites States, for instance, a significant amount of resources have been expended on the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously fighting terrorism. Operation Enduring Freedom provoked mixed feelings among Americans. Many claim that it was a drain on the country’s resources, while the same critics have been unable to argue substantially against what makes it necessary and worthwhile. The same goes for the Afghan First diplomatic policy and the developmental initiatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development under the State Department. The DoD and DoS programs in Afghanistan are founded on the promises of reconstruction, democratic governance, rule of law, and enabling the Afghan government and its security forces to govern the country effectively, particularly on matters of its national security. The goal is to help Afghanistan become responsible and develop the capacity for its protection. This approach is consistent with the pillars of U.S. national security: the triage of defense, diplomacy and development.
Harvard researchers Sull and Spinosa (2007, par. 1) wrote about the biggest challenge to program managers, and that is, how to translate promises into actual strategies, and translate those strategies into action. Overseas reconstruction programs are full of promises. Managers and directors, especially those hired on high-paying contracts, often bear the burden of proving, not only achievements and results, but concrete impact on project beneficiaries. The pressure on programs and individuals is immense. This is true not only for the United States, but also for countless other states under NATO who are investing heavily in reconstruction in Afghanistan, Germany being one of the biggest among them. If these governments fail to prove the success of their programs in Afghanistan, the international community, will withdraw their support in this and all future efforts. This will make program execution increasingly problematic, dwindling funds can be expected, and other agencies like the legislatures within these governments will tend to disengage and distance themselves as they rightfully refuse to be associated with failed programs.
Background
This paper came about in the process of exploring the dilemma faced by government personnel and contractors in conflict zones, particularly those in leadership and executive functions. Attention is focused on the period of 2002 – 2011, the time in which the U.S. spent the most staggering amount of tax-payers’ money to rebuild the post-conflict societies of Afghanistan and Iraq. Additional focus is given to program management contractors, as this is an area of study that the author is currently engaged in. The experiences of the U.S. Defense and State Departments are also given particular focus because these agencies rely increasingly on contractual executives and workers. This paper is made relevant and timely by the recent wave of questioning on the part of Americans – be they from the media, legislature, or civil society – questions that probe the billions of taxpayers’ dollars spent in Afghanistan.
Results for Taxpayer Dollars
Contracting out vital services in the war effort is a complex practice, and growing. In 2009, the number of U.S. soldiers on the ground in Afghanistan rose to roughly 58,000 and contractors rose to almost 74,000. The military force grew further to an estimated 10,000 by the end of that year, and the numbers of contractors increased even more. The price tag for all this goes up to $117 billion during the period of 2002 to 2011 (Dickson, 2011). The war and reconstruction effort came under scrutiny after the non-partisan Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (2011) reported that tens of billions of dollars have been misspent in the war and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission reported on significant errors that contributed to the lack of program success. One of the most notable is stated thus: “… An ill-conceived project that does not fit the cultural, political and economic norms of the society it is meant to serve, or that cannot be supported and maintained, despite how well it is managed.”
There were other errors cited, such as poor planning and oversight by the US government, blatant corruption that doom project outcomes (Dickson, 2011), and services that were never performed or buildings that were never completed (Cole, 2009). But the most essential for the purpose of this paper is the first error cited, that which refers to cultural competency.
The big question is whether executive leadership of these programs is responsible for the lack of results, and to what degree. Can the lack of results be traced to the way program leaders were selected, in the qualifications yardstick that was used to measure their competency, or in the type of preparations they were given prior to deployment?
Failure in Program Execution: A Consequence of Cultural Insensitivity
In a study made by Jeffrey Bordin (2011), a Ph.D. and N2KL Red Team Political and Military Behavioral Scientist, cultural issues were identified as the root of incompatibility and crisis of trust between U.S. Soldiers and their counterparts in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The result is the phenomena of ANSF-committed fratricide-murders. Since May, 2007, according to Bordin, there have been at least 26 murder/attempted murder incidents by ANSF or ASG members against ISAF/UNAMA members, resulting in the killings of at least 58 Western personnel. Most of these incidents have occurred since Oct. 2009, representing 6% of all hostile deaths by ISAF during this period (Bordin, 2011).
Fratricide murders are extreme examples of culture gone wrong, of the consequences suffered when cultural issues go unresolved. But cultural incompatibility and lack of trust permeate the implementation of U.S. programs in Afghanistan even on lower levels of engagement and on a day-to-day basis. Interviews with privately contracted security forces stationed in Afghanistan, as well as interviews with Afghan workers and ordinary citizens, reveal the existence of negative regard that both sides have for each other. What is relevant to this study is the local people’s perception of Americans, be they soldiers, private security, expatriates, embassy officials, or developmental workers.
The Bordin study, based on 68 focus groups conducted on-site, reveals that the local people’s negative views of Americans stem largely from their bad experiences with and negative observations of social behaviors. Numerous social, cultural and operational grievances have been reported against U.S. Soldiers, for instance. Some examples listed in Bordin’s study are: violating female privacy during searches, urinating in public, cursing at, insulting and being rude and vulgar to ANSF members, and unnecessarily shooting animals. U.S. Soldiers were perceived as extremely arrogant, bullying, unwilling to listen to their advice, and were often seen as lacking concern for civilian and ANSF safety during combat. (Bordin, 2011). Negative perceptions by civilians are also connected to behaviors that portray an absence of cultural sensitivity. Examples are: frequent swearing by Americans, and perceived cruelty towards women and children.
In the case of privately contracted program executives and security forces, many complaints have also been reported. The heart of the problem lies in inter-cultural misunderstandings between the local work force and their international supervisors.
It is clearly necessary to define strategies and tactics in the area of cultural awareness development, improvement of cross-cultural communication methods, and cross-cultural negotiation skills. Upgrading the skills and cultural competencies of American staff and supervisors is essential to the success of U.S. security operations and developmental programs in Afghanistan. The need is urgent and crucial if more grave consequences such as program failure and even the death of personnel are to be avoided.
A personal interview of a returning private security officer, who requests to remain anonymous, was conducted with the aim of identifying and analyzing the problematic relationship between local guard forces and the international supervisors who oversee their work. This officer is also a former NATO soldier deployed on several tours to Afghanistan before joining the private sector. He observed that cross-cultural problems manifested in many ways, and across sectors, namely in the private, military and diplomatic spheres. A careful analysis of reported incidents show that cross-cultural misunderstandings have a severe impact on operational capacity. The need for urgent measures was emphasized, including cross-cultural training and detailed step-by-step guidelines for deploying U.S. soldiers, civilian officials, personnel and private contractors to Afghanistan.
Cultural Communication Gone Wrong: A major cause of the problem
One major cause of misunderstanding is the inability of international personnel to recognize subtle cues and hints in communication that is typical in Afghanistan. More than just a language barrier, this is rooted in something deeper, in certain misunderstandings of culturally based assumptions. International supervisors encounter many subtle and foreign forms of verbal and non-verbal communication from their Afghan workers. Unaware and untrained in cross-cultural engagement, they overlook important points, which suffer misinterpretation or go unnoticed. This results in lost opportunities for effective cooperation, or worse, in downright hostility.
According to Major Kron (2007), an expert on the United States Security Cooperation in the Middle East, ineffective cross-cultural communication can directly and adversely affect expectations as to the outcomes of security activities. When this starts happening in an organization, the negative impact of this ineffectiveness will start manifesting itself almost immediately. In many cases of program management in Afghanistan, monitoring reports show a tendency to overlook these impacts, their contributing causes, and the lost opportunities for avoiding further problems. Oftentimes, the intentions of involved parties are misunderstood by one another, leading to suspicions and distrust. When asked to explain plans or justify certain actions, the meanings are diluted due to cross-cultural miscommunication. Perceptions are often altered in negative and unproductive ways, leading to frustration and disappointments, whereas, what is crucial in a perilous environment like Afghanistan is confidence, trust, and strong camaraderie. The ineffectiveness in cross-cultural communication on the part of international supervisors, especially if left unrecognized and uncorrected, runs the risk of disastrous consequences. In the end, the ones who suffer the most are the communities to whom a successful program delivery had been promised.
By recognizing and acknowledging that cross-cultural communication is an essential skill for supervisors, prior to and during deployment, the necessary steps can be taken to ensure propagation of that skill.
Why Cultural Studies must be an integral part of ECQ
The United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is one of the few agencies in the world that gives us clear guidelines on the evaluation and selection of program executives in the public sphere. The OPM defines the competencies needed for entry to senior executive level in public service. The OPM guide is known as The Executive Core Qualifications (ECQs) and is the basis for developing a federal corporate culture. Used by many departments and agencies in their recruitment and selection of personnel for management and executive positions, the ECQs also help in performance management and leadership development. The first ECQ identifies “Leading People” as a major competency expected of federal executives if they are to meet an organization’s vision, mission, and goals. Inherent in “Leading People” is the ability to provide an inclusive workplace that fosters the development of others, facilitates cooperation and teamwork, and supports constructive resolution of conflicts (OPM, 2011). There is room for improving the ECQs by more emphatically defining cross-cultural competency as a core qualification, particularly when it comes to communication skills.
An important measure of the ability for leading people is Conflict Management. Once again, a greater emphasis on cross-cultural skills is necessary, particularly in negotiation and conflict resolution. The executive who is culturally aware is better equipped to recognize potential conflict and take preventive steps immediately. In case prevention fails, he or she is then prepared to implement culturally-sensitive corrective measures.
Leveraging Diversity is another important competency for leading people. It refers to the ability to empower others. This point must be emphasized, especially when dealing with local counterparts in a foreign country. Only then is it possible to foster an inclusive and mutually satisfying work atmosphere across cultures. The leader is also required to be able to delegate tasks, a function that is guided by trust and confidence in team members, including those from another culture where norms are very different from one’s own.
Another requirement is the ability to Develop Others. This requires team building, a skill that relies on the ability to promote a commonality of goals and visions despite individual and cultural differences. This skill also requires the ability to exercise persuasive power in building teams and coalitions, and it is usually challenged when doing so within the context of a different culture.
All of the above cling to a common thread: the executive who is capable of leadership in multi-sector and multi-culture teams inspires commitment and develops collaborative spirit, trust and pride. Therefore, the executive must actively seek to understand other people’s cultures, religious beliefs and practices, and political and societal customs and norms.
In addition, an organization that treats cultural understanding as part of its mission increases its attractiveness. As a result, it increases its capability to attract the right candidates for its programs abroad: people who are highly qualified, culturally competent, and ready to make a difference. The organization’s mission is a positive force in recruiting top candidates, and in driving employee performance. Employees who see a sense of purpose perform better, are better prepared for difficult challenges, are open to learning and innovation, and can solve problems creatively. That sense of purpose is embodied in the organization’s statement of what directs, evaluates, and drives collective activities, the mission statement. Moynihan and Pandey (2012), in their study on mission valence, wrote that transformational leadership is an organizational factor associated with higher public service motivation. Transformational leadership has an important indirect effect on mission valence through its influence on clarifying organizational goals and fostering public service motivation (Moynihan and Pandey, 2012). If cultural awareness is part of the mission valence, international personnel deploying to crisis regions will feel better led and better prepared.
A closer examination of the ECQ, however, reveals that culture is treated as somewhat of a side dish. Perhaps the references to diversity are sufficient under most circumstances, but certainly not for overseas assignments in crisis regions. In such a case, a more comprehensive discussion of the executive’s cross-cultural qualifications becomes necessary.
When personnel get assigned overseas, oftentimes they think that they are adequately prepared in meeting the challenges of working in a foreign country. Often overlooked is the need for training on cultural awareness and practical methods for dealing with the local people, especially if assignments are in crisis regions. It is extremely important to correct this deficiency. Effective and successful relations with local counterparts are part and parcel of managing an international public sector program. This is especially crucial for those who will be in managerial and supervisory functions, for their job centers primarily on human relations, a most important aspect of which is cultural understanding coupled with culturally-informed communication and negotiation skills.
Cross-Cultural Studies as a starting point
English is the working language used in Afghanistan, especially in programs that have international elements. And whenever necessary, there is quite an abundance of interpreters to be found. It is therefore safe to say that cultural rather than linguistic misunderstandings are the root cause of miscommunication. Based on interviews with a German private security supervisor in Kabul, the following examples were gathered:
- Afghans say yes and are ever polite in their responses to requests even though they really mean and desire something else.
- They take great effort to avoid straightforward blunt criticism.
- Their delays seem irrational to us whereas these are actually symptomatic of a disagreement or perhaps a lack of consensus among them
- They seem reluctant to engage in detailed long-term planning
- Their puzzling reluctance to commit to requirements according to our needs assessments is a constant sore point for us.
Much of this cross-cultural misunderstanding is due to what cultural specialist Fons Trompenaars (2008) terms as “Self-Reference Criteria” or SRC, whereby people rely on expectations that are based on their own social conditioning. SRC induces blindness to the forces of culture operating beneath the surface. Because people are conditioned by their social environment to expect and assume certain meanings in given situations, a destructive process might be underway and it can remain undetected. Trompenaars wrote: “Culture is the shared ways groups of people understand and interpret the world” (Trompenaars, 2008, 6). This is rooted in the phenomena they experience over their lifetimes, many of which are unfamiliar to the outsider. Culture creates the core of their values for survival, many of which might even be unacceptable to the foreigner. A lack of awareness over these cultural forces will render even the most experienced professional blind when navigating difficult terrains like Afghanistan. Such lack of understanding is critical, and dangerous.
Given these insights, an intensive training program is strongly recommended to guide all international executives, staff and supervisors in their countries of assignment. Trompenaars and his colleagues provide a useful framework which, though incomplete and unable to account for all cultural phenomena, do give a useful starting point. Important is the ability to keep developing one’s understanding of culture, mainly by documenting experiences and analyzing them using all available frameworks for cultural study.
Cultural training of international personnel before deployment
All executives, staff and supervisors – including, or perhaps especially, those in the military – should undergo effective “cultural awareness” training prior to deployment. The following are general guidelines that the training is recommended to cover. These guidelines will provide the minimum required awareness level of executives, staff and supervisors. The goal is to prevent damaging miscommunication and misunderstandings with the local culture.
Sensitivity to Islamic practices and traditional Afghan norms. Cultural sensitivity demonstrates respect for their values and leads to credible relationships that support mutual interests. Learn and understand the first (and outer) layer of culture: religious imperatives, values, traditions, and attitudes. For example: know about the inappropriate use of the left hand and inappropriate styles of sitting and making gestures, avoid compromising situations among mixed genders, adjust well to the enhanced restrictions during Ramadan, and understand what’s going on when hearing the calls to prayer five times per day.
Sensitivity to what is meant and not just to what is said. Tune in, recognize and appropriately interpret the fundamental motivations behind words. Learn and understand the second layer of culture: the core ethos of the culture, the people’s tools for dealing effectively with their environment given their available resources, their solutions to their continuous problems of survival.
Engaging in continuous learning. For example: compare notes with other staff and identify commonalities of experiences; engage in cross-cultural dialogues with the local people using safe situations (i.e. during company events, or while shopping together at the bazaar) to verify how different mentalities exhibit different approaches to the same situations; engage in guided interpersonal engagements with local staff.
A more detailed presentation of these guidelines can be found separately in a training manual used by Strategic Edge, a multi-cultural partnership for security management, formed by the author of this paper, and based in Switzerland. The manual finds much of its theoretical foundation in the teachings of Trompenaars and Charles Hampden, as well as their critiques, such as the articles by U.S. army leaders like Major Kron. More importantly, the manual is based on a compilation of studies and lessons out of direct experiences by Strategic Edge operatives and partners throughout the world. (For details, contact info@strategic-edge.ch).
On a final note, it must be stated that cultural studies should avoid confining the discussion to country and culture stereotypes. In the end, the most important thing is to see and understand the individuals. Culture is the context in which individuals define themselves; culture is not his “end-all be-all” of the matter. It is also important to re-examine oneself, understand one’s own culture and values, and thereby gain the confidence to deal with a foreign culture.
Conclusion
In his study, Dr. Bordin criticized the senior U.S. and NATO commanders in Kabul for essentially covering up the nature and extent of the problem, all for the sake of political expediency. According to Bordin, “The common refrain from many ISAF [International Security Assistant Force – the joint U.S.-NATO command headquarters in Kabul] political and military officials has been that such murder incidents between ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] and ISAF are isolated and extremely rare. Such proclamations seem disingenuous, if not profoundly intellectually dishonest (Bordin, 2011).” Instead of tackling the problem and heeding Dr. Bordin’s recommendations, organizational superiors like these put on blinders and conveniently bury the cultural precept.
Cultural awareness is one of the keys to the success of fulfilling assignments in a foreign country. A lack of it has certainly been tagged as a major source of program failures. As examples have shown, exhibiting an ethnocentric belief in one’s superiority clearly works against organizational objectives and effectiveness. It can even cost lives. Culture training must be taken very seriously, and it must be accorded the time and resources necessary to ensure that deploying personnel will be adequately equipped before they travel.
References:
Bordin, J. (2011). A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility. Declassified Department of Defense document. Downloaded from http://www.michaelyon-online.com/images/pdf/trust-incompatibility.pdf.
Cole, A. (2009, August). World News: Afghanistan Contractors Outnumber Troops- Despite Surge in U.S. Deployments, More Civilians Are Posted in War Zone; Reliance Echoes the Controversy in Iraq. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved on June 22, 2012 from
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